FIT Scholar
Archive
Game Theory
Stable Matching

Game Theory Overview

1. Definition

Game theory is the study of how individuals or groups make decisions when their choices affect one another. In situations of conflicting interests, it provides a mathematical framework to identify both the best possible outcomes overall and the rational strategies for each participant (Carl, 2021).

The theory is built on two key assumptions. First, players are considered rational actors: every individual or group is treated as a “player” whose goal is to maximize their own benefit, whether by gaining advantages or minimizing losses. Second, each decision is guided by the principle of rational choice, meaning that before acting, a player carefully evaluates the potential gains and risks of their decision.

In practice, Game theory examines decision-making through four main elements: the information and preferences of the players, the strategies available to them, the interactions among these strategies, and the payoffs or outcomes that result. Together, these components shape the structure and analysis of any given game.

Game theory is generally divided into two categories. Cooperative games are those in which players can form binding agreements and coordinate strategies, while non-cooperative games are situations where agreements are not enforceable and must instead rely on self-interest (Sajedeh, 2020).

From a broader perspective, scholars also distinguish between two forms of rationality. Individual rationality refers to situations where each player maximizes their own payoff without considering collective outcomes, as seen in the classic example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In contrast, collective rationality emphasizes the pursuit of mutually beneficial, “win–win” solutions that balance individual interests with group welfare

2. Historical Development

2.1 Early Contributions

The earliest known reference dates back to 1713, when Charles Waldegrave analyzed the card game le her. His solution to a minimax mixed-strategy problem in a two-player version of the game is now recognized as the Waldegrave problem.

In 1838, Antoine Augustin Cournot introduced a model of oligopoly competition in his work Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. His solution—later identified as a form of Nash equilibrium—was criticized by Joseph Bertrand in 1883 for being unrealistic. Bertrand proposed an alternative model of price competition, which was further refined by Francis Ysidro Edgeworth.

In 1913, Ernst Zermelo published one of the first formal mathematical analyses of strategy in chess, applying set theory to demonstrate the concept of an optimal strategy (On an Application of Set Theory to the Theory of the Game Of Chess).

2.2 Establishing the Field

The modern foundation of Game theory was laid by John von Neumann. His 1928 paper, On the Theory of Games of Strategy, introduced the use of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem in analyzing strategic interactions. This work culminated in the influential book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), co-authored with Oskar Morgenstern, which formalized utility theory and provided systematic methods for analyzing two-person zero-sum games.

Around the same time, Émile Borel made important contributions with his book Applications aux Jeux de Hasard (1938). He proved a version of the minimax theorem for symmetric two-person zero-sum games and analyzed the so-called Blotto game. Although he initially conjectured that mixed-strategy equilibria did not exist in finite games, this was later disproven by John von Neumann.

A major breakthrough came in 1950, when John Nash introduced the concept of the Nash equilibrium. Unlike von Neumann and Morgenstern’s work, Nash’s equilibrium applied to a broader range of games, including non-zero-sum and n-player non-cooperative games. His proof that every finite game has at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies transformed the field.

During the 1950s, Game theory expanded rapidly. Key concepts such as the core, extensive-form games, fictitious play, repeated games, and the Shapley value were developed. The decade also marked the first applications of Game theory to philosophy and political science. It was during this period that the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma was formally analyzed, through experiments conducted by Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher at the RAND Corporation, where interest in Game theory was driven by potential applications to global nuclear strategy.

2.3 Growth & Recognition

The development of modern Game theory is closely linked to a number of landmark works and Nobel Prize–winning contributions. The foundation was laid by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern with Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), which established Game theory as a formal discipline. Building on this, John Nash introduced the concept of the Nash equilibrium in his influential papers (1950–1951), showing that every finite game has at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies.

In the 1960s and 1970s, further refinements followed. Reinhard Selten developed the concepts of subgame perfect equilibrium (1965) and trembling hand perfection (1975), while John Harsanyi introduced the theory of incomplete information in Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players (1967–1968). At the same time, John Maynard Smith applied Game theory to biology in Evolution and the Theory of Games (1982), formulating the concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy

3. Type of games

A game is cooperative if the players are able to form binding commitments externally enforced (e.g. through contract law). Cooperative games are often analyzed through the framework of cooperative Game theory, which focuses on predicting which coalitions will form, the joint actions that groups take, and the resulting collective payoffs. Cooperative Game theory provides a high-level approach as it describes only the structure and payoffs of coalitions (R. Chandrasekaran, 2016)

A game is non-cooperative if players cannot form alliances or if all agreements need to be self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats). Non-cooperative Game theory which focuses on predicting individual players’ actions and payoffs by analyzing Nash equilibria. Moreover, non-cooperative Game theory also looks at how strategic interaction will affect the distribution of payoffs (Ritzberger, 2003)

In Game theory, a symmetric game is a game where the payoffs for playing a particular strategy depend only on the other strategies employed, not on who is playing them. If one can change the identities of the players without changing the payoff to the strategies, then a game is symmetric. Symmetry can come in different varieties. Ordinally symmetric games are games that are symmetric with respect to the ordinal structure of the payoffs. A game is quantitatively symmetric if and only if it is symmetric with respect to the exact payoffs. A partnership game is a symmetric game where both players receive identical payoffs for any strategy set. That is, the payoff for playing strategy a against strategy b receives the same payoff as playing strategy b against strategy a. (Shih-Fen Cheng, 2004)

4. Examples

The best example of Game theory is a classical hypothesis called “Prisoners Dilemma”. According to this situation, two people are supposed to be arrested for stealing a car. They have to serve 2-year imprisonment for this. But, the police also suspect that these two people have also committed a bank robbery. The police placed each prisoner in a separate cell. Both of them are told that they are suspects of being bank robbers. They are inquired separately and are not able to communicate with each other.

The prisoners are given two situations:

  • If they both confess to being bank robbers, then each will serve 3-year imprisonment for both car theft and robbery.
  • If only one of them confesses to being a bank robber and the other does not, then the person who confesses will serve 1-year and others will serve 10-year imprisonment.

According to Game theory, the prisoners will either confess or deny the bank robbery. 

So, there are four possible outcomes :

  Figure 2: Payoff matrix of the Prisoners’ Dilemma

(Source: Wikipedia, “Non-cooperative Game theory”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-cooperative_game_theory)

Here, the best option is to deny. In this case, both will have to serve 2 years sentence. But it cannot be guaranteed that others would not confess, therefore most likely both of them would confess and serve the 3-year sentence.

References

  1. Carl-Joar (2021). Game theory and applications —connecting individual-level interactions to collective-level consequences https://research.chalmers.se/publication/527311/file/527311_Fulltext.pdf
  2. Sajedeh Norozpour and Mehdi Safae (2020). An Overview on Game theory and Its Application. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1757-899X/993/1/012114/pdf
  3. Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S.R. Pradelski (2020).Introduction to Game theory- Lecture Notes  02-game-theory.pdf 
  4. R. Chandrasekaran,(2016). “Cooperative Game theory” cooperative-game-theory-rev.dvi
  5. Ritzberger, K. (2003). Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game theory. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, 159(3), 601. https://doi.org/10.1628/0932456032954792
  6. Shih-Fen Cheng, Daniel M. Reeves, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman 92004). “Notes on Equilibria in Symmetric Games” https://strategicreasoning.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/notes-symetric.pdf#:~:text=A%20game%20in%20normal%20form%20is%20symmetric%20if,provide%20a%20formal%20definition%20in%20the%20next%20sec-tion.%29 
  7. Yin, Q., Yu, T., Feng, X., Yang, J., & Huang, K. (2024). An Asymmetric Game Theoretic Learning Model. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 130–143. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-8502-5_10
  8. Ilan Adler (2012), The equivalence of linear programs and zero-sum games, International Journal of Game theory.
  9. Master Class (2022).Zero-Sum Game Meaning: Examples of Zero-Sum Games Zero-Sum Game Meaning: Examples of Zero-Sum Games – 2025 – MasterClass 
  10. Brocas, I., Carrillo, J. D., & Sachdeva, A. (2018). The path to equilibrium in sequential and simultaneous games: A mousetracking study. Journal of Economic Theory, 178, 246–274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.011 

Dig deeper into Stable Matching

Game Theory | Economics | MIT OpenCourseWare

Comprehensive game theory course materials from MIT covering fundamental concepts, solution methods, and applications across economics and strategic analysis.

Game Theory 101

Video lecture series introducing game theory concepts with practical examples and interactive learning approaches for beginners.

Definition, Facts, & Examples | Britannica

Authoritative encyclopedia entry providing clear definitions, historical context, and real-world examples of game theory applications.

Stable Matching Overview

1. Introduction & Definition

Stable Matching Theory addresses a fundamental economic problem: how to allocate resources efficiently in contexts where traditional price mechanisms are ineffective or ethically impermissible. As highlighted in the work of Nobel laureates Lloyd Shapley and Alvin Roth, this is crucial for assigning new doctors to hospitals, students to schools, and organs for transplant markets where monetary payments cannot or should not be used.

The core theoretical concept is stability. An allocation is considered stable if no individuals perceive any gains from further trade. In the context of matching, this means there are no blocking pairs: a pair of agents who would both prefer to be matched with each other over their current assignments. Stability ensures the outcome is self-enforcing, as no pair has both the incentive and ability to undermine the match.

The foundational mechanism for achieving stability is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, or deferred acceptance algorithm, developed by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962. This algorithm provides a set of simple rules that always lead to a stable matching by having one side (e.g., men or hospitals) propose to the other (e.g., women or students), who then tentatively accept or defer offers based on their preferences. The process guarantees that a stable solution exists and can be found systematically, moving from abstract theory to a powerful tool for practical market design.

2. History

The formal study of stable matching began with the seminal work of David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962,”College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” which introduced the stable marriage problem. They proved that for any equal-sized sets of men and women, a stable matching always exists and provided the Gale-Shapley algorithm (also called the deferred acceptance algorithm) to find such a matching efficiently. The theory has roots in earlier mathematical problems related to optimal transport and cooperative game theory but was revolutionized by Gale and Shapley’s approach to pairwise matching.

3. Famous Authors & Their Contributions

  • David Gale and Lloyd Shapley: Introduced the stable marriage problem and the Gale-Shapley algorithm, proving the existence of stable matchings and providing a constructive method to find them.
  • Alvin E. Roth: Extended the theory to practical applications, such as the U.S. medical residency match, and contributed to the design of real-world matching markets.
  • Shapley and Shubik: Developed transferable utility matching models, linking stable matching to cooperative game theory and market design.
  • Gary Becker: Applied transferable utility matching to marriage markets, incorporating economic incentives into the theory.

4. Conditions of the Matching Problem

The stable matching problem addresses the task of pairing two disjoint sets of agents, for example men and women in a marriage context or students and schools in an admission system. Each agent in one set is assumed to have a complete and strict preference ranking over all members of the opposite set. Based on these preferences, a matching is defined as an assignment that pairs agents from the two sets with one another. However, not every matching guarantees satisfaction or fairness, which is why the notion of stability becomes crucial.

A matching is considered stable when there is no so-called blocking pair. A blocking pair refers to a situation where two agents, one from each set, both prefer each other over their current partners in the matching. If such a pair exists, it creates an incentive for them to abandon the given assignment and form their own partnership, thereby undermining the validity of the overall solution. Stability eliminates this issue by ensuring that no two agents have reason to deviate from the assigned matching.

Formally, let MMM be a matching. A pair (m,w)(m, w)(m,w) is said to block MMM if agent mmm prefers www over his assigned partner in MMM, and simultaneously, agent www prefers mmm over her assigned partner. When no such pair exists, the matching is deemed stable. This property makes stable matchings self-enforcing, meaning agents have no incentive to act outside the rules of the system.

5. Example Matching Doctors to Hospitals: The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)

This is the quintessential example of theory informing practice. The market for new doctors in the U.S. was historically chaotic, with hospitals making early offers and students forced to decide without knowing all options, leading to widespread instability.

The Problem: The original, decentralized process produced unstable matches because not enough offers could be made in time for mutually beneficial trades to occur.

The Theoretical Insight: Alvin Roth discovered that the clearinghouse algorithm introduced in the 1950s was, unknowingly, a variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. He hypothesized that its success was due to its ability to produce stable matches.

Practical Redesign: By the 1990s, the NRMP faced new challenges, such as accommodating dual-doctor couples. The original algorithm, which favored the proposing side (hospitals), was also criticized. In 1995, Roth was tasked with a redesign. The new algorithm, adopted in 1997, was built on applicant proposals (favoring students) and designed to be immune to strategic manipulation. This redesign, supporting over 20,000 matches annually, confirmed that a theoretically sound, stable mechanism could be adapted to complex real-world constraints.

Dig deeper into Stable Matching

MIT 14.16 S16 Matching Theory Lecture Slides

Comprehensive matching theory course materials from MIT covering fundamental concepts, solution methods, and applications across economics and strategic analysis.

2.11.2 Matching Ritual: Video

Video lecture exploring matching rituals and algorithms with practical examples and interactive learning approaches for understanding matching theory.

Definition, Facts, & Examples | Britannica

Authoritative encyclopedia entry providing clear definitions, historical context, and real-world examples of game theory applications.